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1. Introduction
The direct and formal relationship between unsustainable forestry practices and
global climate change goes back at least to the late 1970’s. Since the Declaration of the
World Climate Conference in 1979, the international community acknowledged that
deforestation, and changes of land use, such as agriculture and pastoral practices, were
contributing to the increased amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 2 In 1989, the
Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change recognized a
growing international preoccupation with the alteration of the composition of the Earth’s
atmosphere due to anthropogenic activities; stressed out the importance of sustainable
forestry, reforestation, afforestation and conservation activities; and called for a world net
forest growth of 12 million hectares per year in the beginning of the 21st Century. 3 Shortly
after IPCC’s First Assessment report, the Second World Climate Conference, held in
Geneva from 29 October to 7 November 1990, called upon the international community to
take measures to increase “sinks” of greenhouse gases. 4
This was the scenario on forest and forestry leading to the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the formal and fundamental pillar
to the current climate change legal regime. Among general norms and principles, the
Convention called upon developed countries, based on the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility, to adopt binding commitments envisioning greenhouse gases
emissions reductions and limitations. In mitigating the adverse impacts of emissions
limitations and reductions commitments, the Convention allowed the Parties to implement
policies and measures domestically, and/or jointly.
This present study focuses on the evolving debates on forest and forestry activities
implemented jointly, more specifically those under the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), 15 years after the UNFCCC, and 10 years after the Kyoto Protocol. Launched by
COP-1 through the so-called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Pilot Phase, it was the
Kyoto Protocol that effectively created the flexibility mechanisms that would allow for
joint implementation of policies and measures under the climate change regime. Articles 6
and 12 respectively envisioned the joint implementation (JI) (between developed countries
and economies in transition), and the clean development mechanism (CDM) (between
developed and developing countries). The overall objective of this paper is to identify the
current political, policy, legal, and technical challenges inherent to CDM project-based
forest and forestry activities, provide with an assessment of likely trends for upcoming
commitment periods and, finally, propose viable solutions to overcome future obstacles
currently preventing further developments in this area of the CDM.
2

Declaration of the World Climate, Feb. 12- Feb. 23, 1979,
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0003/000376/037648eb.pdf (“[W]e can say with some confidence that the
burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and changes of land use have increased the amount of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere by about 15 per cent during the last century and it is at present increasing by about 0.4 per
cent per year.”).
3
The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, Nov. 7, 1989, Selected
International Legal Materials on Global Warming and Climate Change, 5 AM. U.J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 513,
592-601 (1990) [hereinafter Noordwijk Declaration].
4
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Homepage,
http://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/senegal/fact/fs221.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) [hereinafter UNFCCC
Homepage].
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For that, this paper is divided into four different sections as follow: the first one is
designed to demonstrate how forest and sustainable forestry practices were introduced into
the climate change legal regime, the science supporting such inclusion, and the different
definitions, legal status and possible approaches to deal with the issue envisioned by the
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Decisions of the Conference of the Parties / Meeting of the
Parties. The second session is built toward formulating a legal and institutional framework
specific to the CDM forest and forestry project-based within the complex and
comprehensive climate change regime. The third part of the paper identifies the current
obstacles, challenges and impacts to forestry project-activities under the CDM. Lastly,
session four raises possible solutions to overcome those obstacles and challenges for
upcoming commitment periods.
2. The Introduction of Forest and Forestry Activities Into the Climate Change
Legal Regime
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
constituting the formal and fundamental multilateral international agreement of the climate
change legal regime, was adopted in New York on May 9th, 1992, and fully launched
during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 5
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 6 In its Preamble, the Convention expressly recognized the role
and importance of terrestrial ecosystems of “sinks” and “reservoirs” of greenhouse gases in
mitigating global warming. 7
According to the UNFCCC Handbook, “[a] sink is a process, activity or mechanism
that removes GHG from the atmosphere; a reservoir is part of the climate system that
enables a GHG to be stored.”. 8 The characterization of forests and forestry activities as
types of “sinks” and “reservoirs” 9 of carbon dioxide (CO2) was established by scientific
studies, inspiring the climate change legal regime. 10 Legally, despite some general
reference to promoting enhancement of forests, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases
(e.g. articles 4.1(d) and 2(a) of the Convention), the term “forestry” appears once in the

5

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Jun. 3 – Jun. 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 819
[hereinafter UNCED]. See generally VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY & FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 79 (Transnational Publishers 2003) (emphasizing that with the 1972 UN
Conference on the Human Environment and Development (UNCED), the UNCED is a milestone in
international environmental lawmaking).
6
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC, Handbook, at 19 (2006), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/handbook.pdf (last visited Jul. 23, 2007) [hereinafter UNFCCC
Handbook] (a very useful reference material published by the UNFCCC Secretariat “designed to provide an
easy route to understanding the climate change negotiations under the Convention.”).
7
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force
Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC] (“Aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine
ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases,”).
8
UNFCCC Handbook, supra note 6, at 24.
9
UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.1(d) (other examples of “sinks” and “reservoirs” of greenhouse gases are
biomass, oceans and other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems).
10
See generally SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (Springer 1999) (describing the scientific knowledge on forests and forestry
activities behind the climate change legal regime).
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Convention, 11 but without a legal definition being provided. 12
a. The Science Linking Forest and Forestry Activities to the Climate
Change Legal Regime: “Sinks”, “Reservoirs”, and “Sources” of CO2.
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the dominant and most important greenhouse gas 13 among
the five others listed by the climate change legal regime. 14 Carbon dioxide is also the
parameter for measuring other greenhouse gases emissions. 15 In this context, forests play a
role by directly absorbing and storing CO2, but also, indirectly, by offsetting other
greenhouse gases emissions. 16
Growing forests and plants, through photosynthesis, have enormous capacities of
carbon sequestration. Long established old-growth and mature forests can store significant
amounts of carbon for long periods of time. 17 Nonetheless, when disturbed, forests no
longer play a mitigation role in global warming. Rather, they become part of the problem, a
considerable source of carbon dioxide (CO2). 18 Whenever the capacity of the ecosystem to
11

UNFCC, supra note 7, art. 4.1(c).
Cf. Imke Sagemuller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
and The Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for Biodiversity, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 201 (2003) (“As
a framework convention, the UNFCCC includes only few broad references to the removal of GHGs by
sinks.”).
13
See S. Brown, M. Burnham, M. Delaney, M. Powell, R. Vaca and A. Moreno, Issues and Challenges for
Forest-Based Carbon-Offset Projects: A Case Study of the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia, 5
MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 99, 99 (2000) (stating that carbon dioxide is the
most important greenhouse gas in the atmosphere).
14
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Annex A, Dec. 10, 1997,
37 I.L.M. 32 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (other five listed gases are: methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)).
15
Id. arts. 5.3, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32. See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 599 (Found. Press 2d ed. 2002) (1998). (“Not all greenhouse
gases are created equal; different gases have different “global warming potentials” (GWPs). The technical
definition of global warming potentials is the cumulative radiative forcing between the present and some
chosen time horizon caused by a unit mass of gas emitted now, expressed relative to that for some reference
gas, typically CO2. Thus, for example, the global warming potential of methane is 56 times that of CO2 or,
put another way, Methane is 56 times more potent in causing global warming than is CO2 in a century. The
global warming potential for nitrous oxide is 280 and the global warming potential is in the thousands for
many of the HFCs, PFCs and SF6. Thus emitting one ton of these compounds into the atmosphere has
dramatically higher impacts than emitting one ton of CO2 or even methane.”).
16
Pedro Moura Costa & Charlie Wilson, An Equivalence Factor Between C02 Avoided Emissions and
Sequestration – Description and Applications in Forestry, 5 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL
CHANGE 51, 51 (2000).
17
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], IPCC Special Report Land Use, Land-Use Change,
and Forestry, at 2, Summary for Pocilymakers (2000), http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srlulucf-e.pdf [hereinafter
IPCC Special Report LULUCF] (“Newly planted or regenerating forests, in the absence of major
disturbances, will continue to uptake carbon for 20 to 50 years or more after establishment depending on
species and site conditions, though quantitative projections beyond a few decades are uncertain.”). But see
Hawk Jia, Old-growth forests ‘are key carbon sinks’ (Dec. 1, 2006),
http://www.wbcsd.org/puglins/DocSearch/details.asp?type=DocDet&ObjectId=MjE5NzU (last visited Feb. 6,
2007) (contending that a recent study conducted in a 400-year-old forest in southern China is being capable of
soaking up carbon significantly faster than expected).
18
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], Climate Change and the Forest Sector:
Possible National and Subnational Legislation, at 2 (2004), available at
12
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uptake carbon is limited, or the rates of photosynthesis can no longer accompany the
increasing rates of carbon concentrations in the atmosphere, or due to anthropogenic or
natural ecosystem degradation, forests act as sources of CO2. 19 As defined by the
UNFCCC, article 1.9, a ‘“source” means any process or activity which releases a
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.” 20 .
Reflecting this common scientific understanding, article 4.1(d) of the Convention
reinstated the role of forest conservation practices and called upon all parties, while
respecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, 21 to promote and
cooperate in the enhancement of sinks and reservoirs. 22
b. Forest’s and Forestry Activities’ Definitions and Legal Status in the
Climate Change Legal Regime
The definitions and legal status of forest and forestry that legally supported project
activities under the climate change regime experienced two distinct phases: the first one,
based on the generic concepts of “sink”, “reservoir” and “source” provided by the mother
Convention up to the Kyoto Protocol; and a second one, with more precise and specific
notions provided by the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent Conference of the Parties (COPs)
and Meeting of the Parties (MOPs). 23
i. Definitions and Legal Status in the UNFCCC and Up to the
Kyoto Protocol
The UNFCCC presents broad definitions of “sink”, “reservoir”, and “source” 24 to
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5647e/y5647e00.pdf. [hereinafter FAO Climate Change and the Forest
Sector] (“In nature, GHGs are constantly entering and leaving the atmosphere. The oceans exchange CO2 and
other GHGs with the atmosphere and hold CO2 dissolved or precipitated out in sediments. Actively growing
trees and other plants capture CO2 from the atmosphere, combined with water through photosynthesis and
create sugar and more stable carbohydrates. They may store a significant part of the carbon absorbed for
appreciable lengths of time, from years to millennia. Carbohydrates become the building blocks and energy
supply for most of life on Earth. Eventually, when plants and animals die, CO2 returns to the atmosphere.
When wood products and other organic materials burn or decompose, they also release CO2.”).
19
IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 4.
20
UNFCCC art. 1.9 supra note 7.
21
See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 285 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2d ed. 2003) (1995) (discussing in deeper details the principle of common but differentiated responsibility).
22
UNFCCC art. 4.1(d), supra note 7 (“All parties taking into account their common but differentiated
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances,
shall: Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as
appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including
biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems;”).
23
See generally IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at Preface (stressing the importance of setting
clear definitions for forests and forestry activities, the later encompassing afforestation, reforestation, and
deforestation, and that “the challenge is to derive a set of definitions that are simple and consistent with the
aims of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.”).
24
UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 1.8, 1.7 and 1.9. (“‘Sink’ means any process, activity or mechanism which
removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.”; ‘reservoir’
means a component or components of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of
greenhouse gas is stored.”; ‘source’ means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol
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which the concept of forest and forestry are subsumed and, therefore, supported project
activities during the so-called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Pilot Phase. 25 The
primary concern during the negotiations at the three Conferences of the Parties (COP-1,
COP-2 and COP-3, respectively 1995, 1996, and 1997) following the UNFCCC was to
define quantified emissions reductions and limitations for developed countries. 26 Issues
relating to project-based forest and forestry activities were primarily a cost-effective 27 way
to make emissions reductions and limitations commitments feasible in the short term and,
consequently, an important negotiation tool for the imposition of cap commitments upon
developed countries. 28
Only during the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-4) (almost
seven years after the UNFCCC) that a more specific legal regime for land use, land-use
change and forestry started to emerge, one that would eventually encompass project-based
forest and forestry activities. 29
Legally, though, at least until the Kyoto Protocol, the formal connection between
forest and forestry with sink and reservoir was made by article 4.1(d) of the Convention.
This provision called all Parties to promote actions to enhance sinks and reservoirs of
greenhouse gases, including forests.
In this sense, from such ample definitions, on one hand, the legal status of forest and
forestry is inferred: “sink” and “reservoir”. On the other hand, because forests can also emit
CO2 when disturbed, according to the Convention, they could also be deemed as “sources”
of greenhouse gases. 30
or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.”).
25
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on
its First Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 5/CP.1, Activities
implemented jointly under the pilot phase, Berlin, Mar. 28 – Apr. 7, 1995, 19 FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June
6, 1995) [hereinafter Decision 5/CP.1] (“1(b) Decides: That activities implemented jointly should be
compatible with and supportive of national environment and development priorities and strategies, contribute
to cost-effectiveness in achieving global benefits and could be conducted in a comprehensive manner
covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases;”).
26
See MICHAEL GRUBB, CHRISTIAAN VROLIJK & DUNCAN BRACK, THE EMERGION INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE: STRUCTURES AND OPTIONS AFTER BERLIN 7 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs 1995)
(assessing the outcome of the first Conference of the Parties, known as the Berlin Mandate, for whom “[t]he
Mandate calls for a process to begin to strengthen commitments beyond 2000. This process should lead the
industrialized world to ‘elaborate policies and measures’, and to ‘set quantified limitation and reduction
objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions’.
Negotiations are to be completed by early 1997 in order that the results can be adopted at ‘COP-3’(…). The
expectation is that a protocol or other legal agreement will be negotiated at COP-3 defining emission
constraints for Annex 1 Parties potentially up to the year 20202.”).
27
See Joel N. Swisher, Joint Implementation Under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Technical and Institutional Challenges, 2 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 57, 60
(1997) (emphasizing that “there are low-cost opportunities for carbon storage in the forestry sector”).
28
See also id., supra note 27, at 58 (stressing that “expect Annex I countries to implement too large a share of
the emission reductions could be physically or technically infeasible and would likely be inefficient”).
29
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on
its Fourth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 9/CP.4, Land-use,
land-use change and forestry, Buenos Aires, Nov. 2-14, 1998, 40 FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (January 25,
1999) [hereinafter Decision 9/CP.4] (constituting the first specific decision on land use, land-use change and
forestry).
30
See Lavanya Rajamani, Re-Negotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 201 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 207 (2000) (“Forests can be
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In practical terms, this means that whenever the climate change legal regime refers
to enhancement, promotion, and sustainable management of “sinks” and “reservoirs”, and
calls for action to address anthropogenic emissions by “sources”, it is including and
promoting actions on forests and forestry activities. 31 The importance of this empirical
analysis consists on the fact that the lack of more precise definitions and legal status for
forest and forestry in this first period up until the Kyoto Protocol, led to no activity
limitation whatsoever for those participating in the Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot
Phase. 32 For that reason, during the pilot phase, forest and forestry project activities
included afforestation, reforestation, conservation practices and sustainable forest
management. 33
ii. Definitions and Legal Status in the Kyoto Protocol and
Subsequent COPs/MOPs
After the Kyoto Protocol had expressly embraced forest and forestry practices,
narrowing down the Convention’s broad definitions of sinks, reservoirs and sources of
CO2, 34 negotiators faced the need to create a specific legal regime to reconcile conflicting
interests of those Parties supporting such activities with those opposing them. 35 With the
scientific support provided by the IPCC and FAO, 36 added to the technical expertise of the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 37 , negotiators began to
shaping a more specific legal regime to address land use, land-use change and forestry. 38
sources, sinks, or reservoirs of GHGs.”).
31
See generally OBERTHÜR ET AL., supra note 10, at 131 (specifying the range of the term “sink”, and
highlighting that “[i]n general, forests have the highest sink potential, depending, however, on age and
condition of the forest.”).
32
Decision 5/CP.1, supra note 25.
33
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Review of the Implementation of the
Convention and of Decisions of the First Session of the Conference of the Parties, Activities Implemented
Jointly: Annual Review of Progress Under the Pilot Phase, Progress report on activities implemented jointly,
Geneva, July 8 – 19, 1996, 5 FCCC/CP/1996/14 (June 4, 1995) [hereinafter 1996 AIJ Pilot Phase Report]
(reporting the occurrence of five ongoing projects in forest preservation, restoration or reforestation and four
in afforestation).
34
Kyoto Protocol arts. 3.3 and 3.4, supra note 17.
35
See FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE REGIME A GUIDE TO RULES,
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 123 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (“The technical complexity, and high
political stakes, of sinks issues contributed significantly to the breakdown of negotiations at The Hague at
COP-6 part I.”).
36
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on
the First Part of its Sixth Session, Note by the President of the Conference of the Parties, The Hague,
November 13-25, 2000, 12 FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.2 (April 4, 2001) [hereinafter COP-6 Note by the
President] (“Parties agree that for the implementation of Article 3.3, [of the Kyoto Protocol] “forest” is
defined in accordance with the FAO definition. (…) Parties decide that for defining afforestation,
reforestation and deforestation [forestry activities] the set of IPCC definitions shall be applied.”).
37
See generally GRUBB ET AL., supra note 26, at 2 (explaining that the purpose of the SBSTA is to function as
“the main interlocutor between the scientific world and the Convention process;” and stressing that the
SBSTA is different from the IPCC).
38
See OBERTHÜR ET AL., supra note 10, at 132 (“Although the issue of sinks always loomed in the background
of the negotiations prior to Kyoto, serious negotiations on this only began at AGBM 8 in October 1997. At
this meeting, many Parties realized that there was almost no factual basis on which to take a decision. The
whole issue of LUCF (Land-use Change and Forestry), as it was finally referred to, was surrounded by
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The rationale behind a specific legal regime was to make the Convention’s ultimate
objective feasible, by allowing developed countries to offset part of their quantified
emissions reductions and limitations commitments through jointly project-based practices
under flexibility mechanisms, 39 (one approach) and through the promotion and
enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases domestically (another
approach). 40
Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol set the stage for the beginning of a
specific regulatory regime to deal with land-use change and forestry activities. The first
decision carrying on the mandate established by the aforementioned provisions was
decision 9/CP.4, taken pursuant COP-4 in Buenos Aires, 1999. From then on, this
regulatory regime became known as “land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)”.41
At a first stage, Parties opted for limiting LULUCF activities to afforestation, reforestation
and deforestation practices, 42 (the later meaning “avoided deforestation” 43 ) while providing
for enough flexibility to the inclusion of additional activities. 44
Afforestation and reforestation are both defined as the human-induced conversion of
non-forested areas into forested, but with a slightly difference: the prior presupposes that
the converted land into forested area has not been forested for at least 50 years, while the
later is the conversion of land that once was forested into forested area, but limited to those
areas that did not have forest on December 31, 1989. 45
Under intense political debate over conflicting interests,46 the Parties agreed upon

uncertainties.”).
39
Anita M. Halvorssen, The Kyoto Protocol and Developing Countries—The Clean Development Mechanism,
16 COLO. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 353, 363 (2005) (“The Kyoto Protocol introduced three market-based, flexible
mechanisms that enable Annex I Parties to meet part of their emission reduction commitments in a more cost
effective manner. These mechanisms, also referred to as Kyoto Mechanisms, include emissions trading, joint
implementation, and (…) clean development mechanism (CDM). The idea behind these mechanisms is that
the cost of limiting emissions will differ from one region to another, yet the benefit for the atmosphere is the
same, regardless of where the action is taken.”).
40
See Mathew Vespa, Climate Change 2001: Kyoto At Bonn and Marrakech, 29 ECOLOGY L. Q. 395, 409
(2002) (differentiating domestic application of land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) from
LULUCF in the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol).
41
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Fourth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 4/CP.9, Land-use, landuse change, forestry, Buenos Aires, November 2 - 14, 1998, 40 FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (January 25, 1999)
[hereinafter Decision 4/CP.9].
42
Kyoto Protocol art. 3.3, supra note 14 (“The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and
removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to
afforestation, reforestation and deforestation….”).
43
Pedro Moura-Costa, Forestry and the Climate Change Convention: 10 –years of Evolution, 7 available at
http://www.gm-unccd.org/FIELD/Private/Eco/Eco3.pdf (last visited April 8, 2007).
44
Kyoto Protocol art. 3.4, supra note 14 (“The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and
guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas
emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and forestry
categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I….”).
45
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Seventh Session, Part Two: Action Taken, Decision 11/CP.7, Land-use, land-use change, forestry, Marrakech,
Oct. 29 – Nov. 10, 2001, 58 FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (January 21, 2002) [hereinafter Decision 11/CP.7].
46
Rajamani, supra note 30, at 223 (“At COP-6, the Umbrella Group argued in favor of including additional
activities in the first commitment period. However, the AOSIS and the EU opposed it.”).
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additional activities during COP-7 in Marrakech 47 , adding revegetation, forest
management, cropland management, and grazing land management to those activities
conducted domestically, but excluding them from jointly implemented project-based
activities. 48
From the newly-established legal regime on LULUCF, definitions on activities,
although broad in nature, 49 were useful operational guidance on handling this one form of
accountability under the UNFCCC. Thus, the Annex to decision 16/CMP.1 provided
definitions to “forest”, “afforestation”, “reforestation”, “deforestation”, “revegetation”,
“forest management”, “cropland management”, and “grazing land management”. 50
c. Two Different Approaches to Accounting for Forests and Forestry
Activities
Because developed countries were concerned that reliance solely upon domestic
measures to curb anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions could impair their national
economies by imposing a significant financial burden as a result of mandatory emissions
reductions, the Kyoto Protocol envisioned accountability through market-based flexibility
mechanisms: emissions trading, joint implementation, and clean development
mechanism. 51 For forest and forestry, this scenario opened two possible approaches: first,
accounting domestically for LULUCF; and second, through project-based activities abroad
limited to afforestation and reforestation practices.
i. Accounting for Domestic Land Use, Land-Use Change, and
Forestry Activities (LULUCF)
To some countries, accounting for LULUCF could offset up to 10% of their national
gross emissions. For others, due to demographic and land-use patterns, sequestration
potentials from enhancement of sinks are limited. As a consequence, accounting for
LULUCF activities became a big part of the interests at stake during the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations, dividing the Parties considerably and impairing much of the progress on a
common and satisfactory agreement. 52
Through Decision 11/CP.7 the Parties addressed some of the previous concerns,
while also requesting the SBSTA and the IPCC to develop and elaborate guidelines,
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monitoring and reporting methodologies. 53 Following the Parties’ request, IPCC issued a
report on good practice guidance for land use, land-use change and forestry, 54 and another
one on definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human
Induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types. 55 The IPCC
work and SBSTA advices were based on the general principles governing accountability for
LULUCF activities undertaken domestically by Annex I countries. 56
Under this framework regulatory regime governing LULUCF accountability, for the
first commitment period 57 a selected domestic forestry activity can add or subtract to an
Annex I Party’s assigned amount, whether the practice constitute a sink or a source of
carbon dioxide, respectively. 58 Accountable forestry activities include afforestation,
reforestation, deforestation, regevetation, forest, cropland and grazing land management. 59
Any improvement made domestically using one or more of the abovementioned
listed forestry activities will add to a Party’s assigned amount (“credits”) for the first
commitment period, so long as a formal selection of any or all of them is made timely
(identification in the Party’s annual report), demonstration that the chosen activities had
occurred since 1990, and are human-induced. 60 One the other hand, whenever verifiable
human-induced changes in land use and forestry results in a net emission of greenhouse
gas, a subtraction on an Annex I Party’s assigned amount shall take place. 61
The estimates are based on annual national inventories and communications 62 on
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks that Annex I Parties are
required to submit. 63 The information provided is used in the establishment of assigned
amounts. 64 A limitation in accounting, either positively (crediting) or negatively (debiting)
for domestic LULUCF activities is imposed individually to each Annex I Party, and
measured in metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent per year. Those quantified
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limitations to be subtracted or added to a Party’s assigned amount are found in an Appendix
to Decision 16/CMP.1. 65
ii. Accounting for Forestry Activities under
Flexibility Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol

Project-Based

Annex I Parties can claim credits against their assigned amounts for forestry project
activities implemented jointly with another Annex I Party (Joint Implementation) or with a
non-Annex I Party (Clean Development Mechanism). 66 The origin of joint projects goes
back to the text of the Convention, 67 more precisely article 4.2(a) that generically
mentioned the possibility of Annex I parties to implement policies and measures jointly. 68
On the road to Kyoto, and during the negotiations of the protocol at COP-3,
flexibility was a highly contentious issue among Parties. One the one side, the
JUSSCANNZ 69 countries envisioned the opportunity to invest in projects abroad as a cheap
way to mitigate their commitments, especially those related to forest and forestry project
activities 70 , and the only feasible way to achieve them without hurting their economies. On
the other side, the G-77 plus China 71 and the European Union faced them as a loophole in
the Protocol. The prior feared the so-called “carbon colonialism” or “eco-colonialism”, 72
the later concern was basically on ethical grounds. 73 Opponents saw forest and forestry
projects abroad as allowing Annex I countries to invest in developing countries without
having to take any stronger domestic mitigation measures. 74
The conflicts were partially resolved with the parties agreeing upon limiting forestry
65
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activities to afforestation and reforestation projects, the exclusion of nuclear activities,75
and the requirement that project-based activities shall be supplemental to domestic
measures and policies. 76 Subsequently, since the Marrakech Accords (COP-7) the debate
around this controversy is void, due to the express embracement of forestry activities by
decision 11/CP.7. 77
3. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Forest and Forestry Project Activities:
Legal and Institutional Framework
This section aims at building and examining the CDM forest and forestry projectactivities legal and institutional framework and how they were influenced by the conflicting
interests surrounding them, the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge, and the
practice provided during the AIJ pilot phase.
a. The Evolution of the Legal Framework
A legal framework for forest and forest project-activities in the CDM is a subproduct of a broader regulatory regime for joint implementation flexibility mechanisms.
Articles 4.2(a), (b), (d), and 3.3 of the UNFCCC are the main pillars of the joint
implementation regulatory regime. 78 The first action in this regard was taken at COP-1, in
Berlin, 1995, when the parties agreed upon an Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Pilot
Phase. 79 Shortly after, the Kyoto Protocol not only embraced the concept of Joint
Implementation among Annex I Parties, but also extended it to non-Annex I countries
(Clean Development Mechanism). 80
i. Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot Phase
The AIJ pilot phase made operational the UNFCCC broad provisions authorizing
joint implementation of policies and measures. 81 Decision 5/CP.1 taken at COP-1, in
Berlin, 1995, expressly recognized the mandate of Article 4.2(d) imposing upon the
Conference of the Parties the duty to regulate joint implementation of policies and
measures to curb anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. To reconcile and
accommodate developing countries’ concerns, project-activities undertaken pursuant to the
75
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pilot phase did not provide credits against the, then, not yet agreed upon developed
countries’ assigned amounts. The AIJ pilot phase was voluntarily in nature.
Moreover, the pilot phase embraced participation of non-Annex I countries hosting
project-based activities undertaken thereof. This experimental period also covered
generically “all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases;”, allowing for
ample use of forest and forestry project activities. The fact is that, “[t]he importance of
information, training, appropriate capacity and institutions for the development of CDM
projects is underlined by experience from the pilot phase of Activities Implemented
Jointly.”. 82
The Parties’ experience during the pilot phase showed geographic trends and
potential social and environmental benefits related to forest and forestry project activities,
which provided substantial background on future negotiations. 83 All these elements were
crucial during the discussions over flexibility mechanisms in Kyoto, during the COP-3, and
beyond, when negotiators faced the dilemma, and conflicting pressures of whether to
include or not forest and forestry activities in the CDM. 84
1. A Brief Assessment of the AIJ Pilot Phase Main Reports,
and Positive Outcomes
Through the AIJ pilot phase reporting requirements, the SBSTA was able to
produce annual synthesis reports, before recommending a comprehensive review of the
pilot phase, which was completed and sent to the COP-5 in Bonn, 1999. 85 Specifically with
regard to forest and forestry project activities, those annual synthesis reports and the final
review of the AIJ pilot phase provided useful data on important geographical trends,
technical challenges (monitoring and reporting), social and environmental benefits and
impacts, possible global benefits (in comparison with other types of project-activities), and
implications on national economies (helping developing countries to achieve sustainable
development, and developed countries in achieving their commitments under the climate
change regime). 86 The figures bellow, excerpted from the SBSTA synthesis reports on AIJ
pilot phase, illustrate the aforementioned elements of the experiences gained during this
experimental period:
82
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Figure 3.1

Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot
Phase, Synthesis report on activities implemented jointly, Bonn, October 20 – 29, 1997, 2
FCCC/SBSTA/1997/12/Corr.2 (October 12, 1997).

Figure 3.2

Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot
Phase, Fourth synthesis report and draft revised uniform reporting format, Marrakesh, Oct. 29
– Nov. 9, 2001, 8 FCCC/SBSTA/2001/7 (September 12, 2001).
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are excerpted from the first and fifth synthesis report on the pilot
phase of AIJ, respectively. With respect to the number of forest conservation and forestry
activities and their share in the total reduction of carbon dioxide in 1997, Figure 3.1 shows
that while only numbering 6 out of 39 projects (roughly 15 per cent of the total), they
account for 57 per cent of the final mitigation impact. On the other hand, in 2001, Figure
3.2 shows that while numbering 15 out of 139 projects (roughly 10 per cent of the total),
forest conservation and forestry activities accounted for 35 per cent of the abatement
impact. The data demonstrates that although representing a smaller portion of the total
number of projects, sequestration potentials of forest and forestry activities are significantly
higher in a comparison with other types of projects. In addition, the data collected from
different years shows that the number of forest and forestry project activities decreased
proportionately to the rising on scientific and technical knowledge and certainty on the
complexities of processes related to these activities. 87
In its first synthesis report, the SBSTA highlighted that “most data on the costs and
the amount of GHG abated are only estimates and are, therefore, not a suitable basis for
analysis;”. 88 When the report was released, the Parties were in the final preparations for the
Kyoto negotiations. The IPCC had not yet released its special report on LULUCF, which
only happened in 2000. 89 The first specific decision on forestry activities in the CDM was
only agreed upon in 2003 at COP-9 (decision 19/CP.9), 90 the same year in which the IPCC
Report on Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry was
released. 91 This chronological scenario explains the proportionality between growing
consensus on the challenges of forest and forestry project activities and the consequent
decrease in their total share (both in quantity and in share of GHG abatement impact) in a
comparison with other types of projects, deemed much simpler.
As to the geographical distribution of forest conservation and forestry projects, and
their environmental and socio-economic impacts, the 1999 Subsidiary Bodies’ report on the
issues to be addressed in the review of the pilot phase provided useful source of
information for a more comprehensive assessment of the pilot phase. With regard to socioeconomic aspects of projects undertaken during the pilot phase, the Subsidiary Bodies
verified an increase in capacity-building through enhancement of procedural and
institutional experience, and the Parties reported “active involvement of local communities,
increased public awareness, and the maintenance of natural heritage and historical site”. 92
In this same path, the report highlighted that host Parties, most developing
countries, were being able to attract financial resources and direct them towards national
87
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development goals. Despite the statement made by the Subsidiary Bodies that socioeconomic and environmental factors were not sufficiently addressed, specifically with
respect to forest and forestry activities, the Parties reported environmental benefits on
“fostering biodiversity, improving water and air quality and reducing erosion of
hydrological resources”. 93
In the AIJ pilot phase review report, some Parties linked their development goals to
forestry and land-use. 94 Indeed, Figure 3.3 demonstrates that those Parties, despite not
identified in the report, are most likely to be developing countries in the Latin American
region. Figure 3.3 shows that most of forest preservation and reforestation projects, and
roughly half of afforestation activities were taking place in Latin America and the
Caribbean region. Not surprisingly, considering that a great percentage of the remaining
tropical forests in the world are concentrated in Latin America. 95
A better sense of the region’s potentials for these types of projects can be excerpted
from the fact that the data presented does not list Brazil,96 by far the country with the
greater portion of remaining tropical forests. 97 In addition to the resources availability
element, the costs of forest and forestry GHG abatement practices are considerably lower in
developing countries, which contributed to Latin America’s share of the market in hosting
preservation, reforestation and afforestation project activities. 98
Figure 3.3

Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
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Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice & Subsidiary Body for
Implementation on Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase, part two:
synthesis report on AIJ under the pilot phase, Bonn, Oct. 25 – Nov. 5, 1999, 5
FCCC/SB/1999/5 (September 15, 1999) (AFR – Africa, ASP – Asia and Pacific Region,
EIT – Economies in Transition, LAC – Latin America and Caribbean).

2. The Main Challenges Encountered During the AIJ Pilot
Phase
The major problems encountered by the Parties during the implementation of
project activities were also summarized by the AIJ pilot phase reviewing report.
Highlighting common constrains during the pilot phase was a useful tool for improvements
in the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, particularly in the CDM that
encompasses developing countries’ participation. 99 Among general challenges and
obstacles to all types of projects during the pilot phase, and specifically those related to
forest and forestry were:
(a) differences in the investment climate; (b) cultural differences; (c) insufficient
infrastructure; (d) institutional capacity; (e) relative absence of investment
companies; (f) lack of policy on AIJ and of a clear and transparent set of operational
rules on the part of the host country; (g) lack of awareness in the private sector in
host countries on opportunities represented by AIJ; (h) variations in the degree of
knowledge and acceptance of AIJ by local stakeholders; (i) lack of capacity to
produce comprehensive AIJ project proposals; (j) existing preferences, driven by
established business partnerships, strategic considerations and political priorities for
investors for particular areas; (k) differences in GHG reduction costs and in
transaction costs due to, inter alia, some of the above points; and (l) current
exclusion of crediting for GHG reductions or removals by sinks;….
(e) high transaction costs; and (f) the uncertainty regarding two major interlinked
methodological issues, the identification of the project baseline and additionality. 100
All in all, it is worth noticing that the AIJ pilot phase was characterized by the lack
of stronger oversight mostly due to a weak regulatory regime. Therefore, even though the
data presented were useful in assisting negotiators to model the regulatory framework for
afforestation and reforestation practices in the CDM, and helped to indicate trends and
potentials, the results lack accuracy. Nonetheless, the AIJ pilot phase was crucial in raising
the Parties’ concerns over the technical, scientific and socio-economic challenges related to
forest and forestry project-activities, which inevitably constituted one of the leading factors
to the development of a stronger and tighter regulatory regime specifically to deal with
forest and forestry activities in the CDM. 101
ii. The CDM of the Kyoto Protocol
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The outcome of the COP-3 negotiations was that project-based joint implementation
launched by the UNFCCC, and implemented by the pilot phase, ended up divided by the
Kyoto Protocol into Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). Within the scope of this paper is worthy noticing that the final language of Article
12 (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol provided the CDM with threefold objective: assist nonAnnex I Parties in achieving sustainable development, contribute with the Convention’s
overall objective, and help developed countries in achieving their quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments. 102
iii. The Controversy Whether Forest and Forestry Activities Were
Meant to be Included in the CDM
Prior to the negotiations at COP-3, in Kyoto, the Parties had before them the
SBSTA synthesis report on activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase.103 The
report was noted by decision 10/CP.3 104 , and stressed out the existence of 6 ongoing
forestry preservation and afforestation activities, with ample participation of developing
countries in hosting the projects. 105
Opponents of the inclusion of sinks in the CDM 106 argued that Article 12 did not
provide legal support for such inclusion. Their main argument was a comparison with
Article 6 (JI), in which the inclusion of “sinks” is clearly stated, as opposed to Article 12
(CDM). In addition, the opposition also included the allegation that because sink projects
could not be accurately measured, they did not meet Article 12.5(b)’s requirement that
certification under the CDM should be on the basis of “[r]eal, measurable, and long-term
benefits related to the mitigation of climate change;”. 107
Indeed, whereas Article 6 (JI) of the Kyoto Protocol expressly referred to projects
providing enhancement of removals by sinks, Article 12 (CDM) generally states project
activities without further specifications whatsoever. 108 However, a closer analysis of the
climate change regime did not provide for the exclusion of sink projects from the CDM. 109
First, because JI in the UNFCCC was the origin of the CDM, and under the pilot phase
forest and forestry activities were being utilized amply by Annex I and non-Annex I
Parties. Second, because Article 12 also did not specify any other type of projects, such as
renewable energy, or energy efficiency. It was simply limited to stating the CDM
102

Kyoto Protocol art. 12.2, supra note 14.
SBSTA & SBI 1997 Report, supra note 88.
104
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Third Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 10/CP.3, Activities
implemented jointly under the pilot phase, Kyoto, December 1 - 11, 1997, 41 FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (March
25, 1998) [hereinafter Decision 10/CP.3].
105
SBSTA & SBI 1997 Report, supra note 88, at 4, 5.
106
See Costa, supra note 43, at 8 (stressing out that the main opponents to the inclusion of forestry in the
CDM were the EU, China and India, and that proponents were Latin American countries and the Umbrella
Group – Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Iceland).
107
GRUBB ET AL., supra note 52, at 241.
108
Compare Kyoto Protocol art. 6, supra note 14 (expressly referring to enhancement of removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases), with Kyoto Protocol art. 12, supra note 14 (broadly defining the clean development
mechanism).
109
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 15, at 645 (“Both the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol clearly
contemplate that sinks such as forest would be within the ambit of the climate regime.”).
103

20
objectives, and setting general operational guidance. 110 The omission only constitutes
inaccuracy in the written language utilized in the Kyoto Protocol, but nothing beyond that.
As per the impossibility to measure and monitor forestry projects, currently approved
monitoring methodologies by the CDM Executive Board demonstrate that although harder
than other types of projects, forestry activities can be monitored and measured.
A final common ground was only possible due to some degree of leverage that
countries pushing for the inclusion of forestry activities (Umbrella Group) had, 111
particularly the U.S., Japan, Canada and Australia, 112 so that the Protocol could enter into
force by achieving its required target of 55 per cent of global anthropogenic GHG
emissions. 113 Considering that the U.S. along with other Umbrella Group countries account
for over half of the world’s emissions, their engagement was crucial to the Protocol’s
success. Another important element relied on the fact that the EU was not going to accept
the inclusion of nuclear projects in the CDM. In order to avoid any attempt from the U.S.,
other developed country, or even China and India to push forward the debate on the
inclusion of nuclear energy projects, the EU allowed some flexibility and ended up
accepting forestry activities in the CDM. 114 The controversy was finally settled at COP-7,
in Marrakech, when negotiators agreed to include forestry in the CDM, but limited to
afforestation and reforestation activities. 115
iv. COP-7, Marrakech Accords, 2001, COP-9, Milan, 2003 & COP10, Buenos Aires, 2004
After failing to reach consensus at COP-6, and COP-6 “bis” on the issue of land use,
land-use change and forestry generally, progress made during those two sections of the
conference of the Parties allowed a final agreement on the inclusion of forestry activities in
the CDM at COP-7, in Marrakesh, 2001. 116 The outcome of this meeting was called
“Marrakesh Accords”. 117 Through the Annex to a draft decision on LULUCF the Parties
finally agreed on the inclusion of forestry projects in the CDM based on three pillars of
eligibility and offsetting limitations, and regulatory flexibility for future commitment
periods, as follow: 1) forestry in the CDM is limited to afforestation and reforestation
activities; 2) addition limitation to a Parties’ assigned amount of 1 per cent of base year
emissions, times five (which represents 20% of an Annex I country overall target) 118 ; and
3) a regulatory regime for future commitment periods shall be decided during the
110
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negotiations on the second commitment period. 119
Overall, and at least for the first commitment period, the EU’s main interests
prevailed over the ones from the Umbrella Group. 120 The EU succeeded at banning nuclear
projects in the CDM (decision 17/CP.7), and at limiting not only forestry to afforestation
and reforestation, but also the amount accountable against an Annex I Party’s assigned
amount. 121 In practice, since the EU – Emissions Trading Scheme excluded carbon credits
originated from LULUCF activities, 122 and considering European countries (and their
private entities) constitute the vast majority of Annex I buyers (taking into account that the
U.S. has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol), 123 the inclusion of forestry in the CDM did
not affect significantly EU’s interests for the first commitment period. On the other hand,
the Umbrella Group, if not with the desired amplitude, inserted sinks in the CDM, and left
open the debate for future commitment periods.
Once forestry made it to the CDM, and the Parties had established general eligibility
and offsetting limitations and flexibility on the debate for future commitment periods, an
operational regulatory regime became a requirement. Without further and specific progress
at COP-8, in New Delhi, 2002, the Parties would agree upon a thorough regulatory regime
for forestry in the CDM at COP-9, in Milan, 2003. 124 Decision 19/CP.9 set up modalities
and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM. 125
Decision 19/CP.9 was also particularly important because it affirmed the principles
of Decision 11/CP.7 on LULUCF, and envisioned a more flexible regulatory regime for
small-scale forestry projects in the CDM, 126 following a model that the Parties had already
implemented at COP-8 for other types of activities (renewable energy and energy
efficiency) in the CDM (Annex II to decision 21/CP.8). 127
The forestry legal framework in the CDM was completed for the first commitment
period, when the Parties at COP-10 in Buenos Aires, 2004, agreed upon decision 14/CP.10
on simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale afforestation and reforestation
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project activities in the CDM. 128 This regulatory regime was implemented at MOP-1, in
Montreal, 2005, right after the Kyoto Protocol had entered into force. 129 Table 3.1 below
aims at providing a chronological overview of the general, and specific legal provisions
applicable to forestry project activities under the CDM.
Table 3.1
Provision
Arts. 4.2(a)(b)(d) &
3.3 / UNFCCC
Dec. 5/CP.1
Arts. 3.3, 3.4 & 12 /
Kyoto Protocol
Decs. 7 & 9/CP.4

Subject
JI under the Convention

AIJ Pilot Phase
LULUCF Activities & the
CDM
CDM & LULUCF Work
Programme
Decs. 11, 15 &
LULUCF Activities & the
17/CP.7
CDM
Dec. 21/CP.8
CDM
Dec. 19/CP.9
A/R in the CDM
Decs. 13 & 14/CP.10
Reporting A/R in the
CDM & Simplified A/R
Activities in the CDM
Decs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16
Adopting draft decisions
& 17/CMP.1
recommended by previous
COPs
Source: prepared by the Author.

Status

Adoption

General

1992 UNFCCC

General
General / Specific

1995 COP-1
1997 Kyoto Protocol

General

1998 COP-4

Specific

2001 COP-7

Specific
Specific
Specific

2002 COP-8
2003 COP-9
2004 COP-10

Specific / General

2005 MOP-1

b. Institutional Framework
The 1992 UNFCCC launched a comprehensive institutional framework to
implement measures and polices, develop guidelines and methodologies, and to coordinate
and translate the scientific work into norms and decisions 130 aiming at achieving the
128
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Convention’s ultimate objective: to reduce anthropogenic emissions of GHGs. 131 To this
end, institutions dealing with forestry in the CDM are a sub-product of a broader
framework, one that relies upon the supreme bodies of the Convention and the Protocol, but
also upon more specific institutions unique to the control and management of afforestation
and reforestation projects in the CDM. The following two subsections break down the
CDM forestry institutional framework.
i. Conference of the Parties (COPs) / Meeting of the Parties
(MOPs)
With primary and exclusive decision-making power, the Conference of the Parties is
the highest body on the institutional hierarchy, and from which the regulatory scheme
emerges. 132 Therefore, the legality of the decisions on forestry in the CDM is derived from
the powers conferred by the Convention to the Conference of the Parties, including the
decision as to whether adopt a protocol. 133 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, as a result of COP-3,
expanded the specific CDM forestry institutional framework, 134 and also added to the
Conference of the Parties the function of serving as the meeting of the Parties to the
Protocol. 135
ii. SBSTA & the CDM Executive Board.
The SBSTA is the advisory body to link the available scientific information to the
decision-making process of the climate change regime. 136 It is different from the IPCC, and
it was not designed to replace it. 137 Article 15 of the Kyoto Protocol determined that the
subsidiary bodies created under the Convention remain in charge of providing scientific and
technological advice and assistance to COPs serving as MOPs. 138 Within the CDM forestry
institution framework, the SBSTA takes into account the work produced by the IPCC,
FAO, International Forum on Forests, among other international institutions, and provides
guidance on scientific, technical and technological matters related to afforestation and
reforestation, and recommends decisions to the COP/MOP. 139
131
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Another important organ in the CDM forestry institutional framework is the CDM
Executive Board (EB). Featured in Article 12.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM Executive
Board was implemented by decision 17/CP.7 to carry out the oversight function over
activities in the CDM under the guidance and authority of the COP/MOP. 140 Through
decision 17/CP.7, the COP/MOP expanded EB’s supervisory role, adding to it decisionmaking power over approval of Designated Operational Entities (DOEs), 141 projects,
including the final work on new methodologies, baseline and monitoring methodologies,
and issuance of certified emission reduction (CER). 142 In sum, the EB is the executive body
in charge of handling projects undertaken pursuant to the CDM, and all related matters
thereof. 143
iii. Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) & Afforestation /
Reforestation, and Methodologies Working Groups
The CDM Executive Board can accredit operational entities known as Designated
Operational Entities (DOEs) and recommend them to the COP/MOP for final
designation. 144 The rationale behind the conception of DOEs is that by delegating to an
independent company the validation of proposed CDM projects, and subsequent
verification and certification emissions reductions, the EB preserves its oversight and
decision-making role over proposed new methodologies, baselines and monitoring plans 145 ,
while counting on the efficiency of outside specialized private corporations to have a more
agile process. 146 Should the EB had to operate the technical field work of validation,
verification, and certification of each proposed project, the financial and human resources
necessary would make the process unfeasible. 147
forestry. One of SBSTA’s conclusions on the topic was an interpretation of Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol.
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In addition, by working with different and independent DOEs in the validation,
verification and certification stages, the EB institutional framework is constantly being
crosschecked, diminishing the margin for imprecise certified emissions reductions. This
scheme is particularly important in the CDM context, considering that non-Annex I
countries have no emissions limitation commitments. 148 The downside is that such a
comprehensive process adds bureaucracy and complexity, requiring high level of
multidisciplinary expertise which ends up restricting the participation of developing
countries’ stakeholders, despite the thorough capacity-building scheme envisioned by the
climate change regime. 149
Finally, taken into consideration the wide range of scientific, technical and
technological expertise different projects under the CDM may require, the COP/MOP
conferred upon the EB the authority to “establish committees, panels, or working groups to
assist it in the performance of its functions.”. 150
For forestry related projects, the EB at its fourteenth meeting agreed to establish an
Afforestation and Reforestation Working Group (A&R WG). 151 In assisting the EB, the
A&R WG is responsible to comment on proposed new baselines and monitoring
methodologies for forestry projects, prepare draft reformatted versions of those approved
by the EB, and recommend available options to expand the applicability of approved A/R
methodologies. 152 In this sense, the A&G WG works closely and in consonance with the
Methodologies Panel (Meth Panel) agreed upon the third meeting of the EB, 153 which is
designed to provide the EB with recommendations on guidelines for methodologies and for
baselines and monitoring plans, including those for afforestation and reforestation
projects. 154
iv. Multilateral Investment Institutions
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Multilateral investors are an important element of the CDM forestry institution
framework, and also in fomenting carbon markets worldwide. Within the initiatives to
launch a forestry carbon market that could be attractive to investors, and project developers
in the post-Kyoto, the following are worth mentioning: the Sydney Futures Exchange for
forestry-based carbon credits, the GHG tradable permit trading mechanism coordinated by
UNCTAD, and the GHG emissions trading programme of the International Petroleum
Exchange. 155 These early innovative attempts lead to “the creation of the International
Emissions Trading Association, alongside the Emissions Market Association, the Chicago
Climate Exchange, and country-level emission trading systems such as in the UK and
Denmark.” 156
The World Bank launched in 2003 the BioCarbon fund, described as a
public/private initiative aiming at delivering “cost-effective emission reductions, while
promoting biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation.” 157 The BioCarbon fund is
inspired in the previous World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund established in 1999 to promote
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects under the CDM. 158 While there are
general carbon investment funds currently available worldwide, 159 within the CDM forestry
institutional framework, the BioCarbon fund consolidates the World Bank initiative as the
main multilateral investment institution, one that involves public and private investors, and
is particularly sensitive to social and environmental benefits. 160
c. Provisions for Domestic Legal & Institutional Framework (Designated
National Authority – DNA)
One of the core principles of the CDM is that participation is voluntary and
dependent upon prior approval by each Party involved. 161 Furthermore, in accomplishing
one of the CDM’s objectives - assisting developing countries in achieving sustainable
development – the COP/MOP requires project developers a formal evaluation issued by the
host country of whether a proposed project activity meets its sustainable development
goals. 162 The procedural participation requirement given to a non-Annex I Party wishing to
participate in the CDM and, therefore, externalize to project developers voluntariness and
compliance with sustainable development goals, is by establishing a designated national
155
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authority (DNA). 163 This provision opened up the field for the development of national
legal and institutional frameworks by non-Annex I countries desiring to participate in the
CDM.
4. Current Obstacles, Challenges and Impacts (Positives and Negatives) to
Forestry Project Activities under the CDM
In light of its controversial nature, forestry activities in the CDM have raised over
the past decade many positives and negatives assessments regarding inherent impacts of
their implementation. Moreover, the expansion of forestry over afforestation and
reforestation activities is also facing political, legal and technical obstacles.
a. Political, Policy and Legal Obstacles
G.J.H. van Hoof has pointed out that “[i]f delay in, or failure of ratification are the
result of unwillingness on the part of the States concerned the problem, of course, is first of
all of a political nature.”. 164 This is the case of the U.S. refusal in ratifying the Kyoto
Protocol, which added to the EU policy decision undertaken within its Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) of rejecting CDM forestry projects, 165 and the climate change forestry
legal limitation to afforestation and reforestation activities, form the core obstacles
examined in this section. 166
i. U.S. Resistance in Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol
In 1998, the U.S Congress passed Senate Resolution 98 (S.Res.98), “urging the
President not to agree to a treaty that did not include binding commitments for developing
countries, or that would cause harm to the U.S. economy.” 167 In March of 2001, the Bush
administration announced the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, 168 shortly after the U.S.
experienced the tragedy of September 11th. Though not totally clear if the terrorist attack
influenced U.S. policies in the climate change regime, some have suggested that the lack of
stronger involvement with the Kyoto Protocol over the past years indicates that the tragedy
might had shifted U.S.’s focus. 169
For what it represents economically and politically, the U.S. is a major player in any
international negotiation. Therefore, the U.S. resistance in accepting the overall provisions
of the Kyoto Protocol constitutes a significant political obstacle to the development of
forestry activities within the climate change regime. 170 By coming on board, the U.S.
163
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would play a much greater role not only on actively pushing negotiations towards
expanding eligible activities for future commitment periods, but also in fomenting the
market for forestry certified emissions reductions (CERs).
ii. EU Refusal to Accept CDM Forest and Forestry Project
Activities
Effectively starting on 1 January 2005, the European Union Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) is the world biggest GHG domestic emissions trading scheme. 171 The
market for CERs created by the EU ETS increased significantly the demand for project
activities undertaken in the CDM. Although not for afforestation and reforestation,
considering that the provision authorizing the use of CERs expressly excluded those from
LULUCF activities. 172 Because most of the countries with established commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol are part of the EU, 173 the policy of excluding CERs from forestry
project activities is a major obstacle for the enhancement of a stronger market in this area,
which inevitably hampers the development of new forestry-based GHG mitigation
projects. 174
iii. CDM Limitation to Afforestation and Reforestation Project
Activities
One of the major obstacles to an ample expansion of land use, land-use change and
forestry projects in the CDM for the first commitment period is the legal limitation imposed
upon these kinds of activities to merely anthropogenic afforestation and reforestation
practices. The preoccupation and over precaution in effectively imposing such limitation
made the climate change negotiators to include it in at least three different decisions
(Annex to the draft decision 11/CP.7, decisions 17/CP.7, 175 and 19/CP.9 176 ) prior to the
first meeting of the Parties, and also in those adopted thereof. 177 Moreover, “[t]he literature
regarding forestry as a climate change mitigation strategy suggests that efforts to constrain
project-based forestry interventions to reforestation and afforestation projects is technically
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inappropriate.” 178 Therefore, such limitation constitutes a legal obstacle for the expansion
and further developments of LULUCF activities within the climate change regime in future
commitment periods.
b. Technical Challenges
According to FAO, the forestry sector is “technically especially challenging in
terms of CDM project formulation….”. 179 The first substantial decision addressing
accountability for domestic action on LULUCF (decision 11/CP.7) in its request to the
SBSTA, called for the development of definitions and modalities for including afforestation
and reforestation in the CDM, without leaving aside the issues of non-permanence,
additionality and leakage. 180 These technical concerns were based on the IPCC work
expressed in its 2000 special report on LULUCF. 181 In addition, decision 19/CP.9’s
requirement that non-Annex I countries shall opt for a definition of forest based on preestablished parameters 182 , added another technical challenge addressed by the FAO Forest
and Climate Change Working Paper 4. 183
i. Additionality
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes that emissions reductions from CDM
projects have to be “additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified
project activity.” 184 The rationale behind additionality lies on the fact that “if developing
nation would have undertaken the same emissions reduction projects even in the absence of
Annex I investment, the world could have enjoyed the same emissions reductions without
the CDM and without giving Annex I countries credits that let them emit more.” 185
Aiming at assisting forestry project developers, the Afforestation Reforestation
Working Group (AR WG) at its fifth meeting revised a tool for demonstration and
assessment of additionality. 186 The CDM Executive Board adopted it at its twenty first
meeting as a highly recommended guideline although not mandatory, 187 which shows that
considerable progress was made over the past decade and a half.
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Verifying whether a project activity meets the additionality requirement is crucial
for the emissions trading scheme, and often constitute a technical challenge, especially in
the forestry field 188 due to the fact that such natural ecosystems are exposed to innumerous
unpredictable natural and anthropogenic factors (e.g., fires, extreme meteorological events,
pests, urban sprawling, etc.). 189 Therefore, additionality is a necessary technical burden that
needs to be properly addressed in a project-by-project basis. 190
ii. Domestic Definition of Forest
In the 2000 special report on land use, land-use change and forestry, the IPCC
highlighted that a successful forestry carbon offset program would necessarily depend on
clear definitions of forest and forestry activities. The definitions of forest varied
considerably among countries based on different criteria (e.g., legal, administrative, or
cultural consideration). 191 Nonetheless, for the successful implementation of LULUCF it
was crucial to harmonize the definitions for the climate change regime. 192 In an attempt to
harmonize domestic definitions, the annex to the draft decision attached to decision
19/CP.9 imposed as a mandatory requirement that countries define forest prior to
participating in the CDM. This provision allowed some flexibility for the Parties in
defining forests to opt for a minimum tree crown cover, land area, and tree height between
numbers varying from 10 to 30 per cent, 0.05 to 1 hectare, and 2 to 5 meters,
respectively. 193 The rationale behind this was to provide the Parties some margin to adjust
their domestic definition accordantly to their natural and geographic realities. An
international uniform definition would not be able to encompass the enormous variety of
ecosystems around the world, and would inevitably end up favoring some countries in
detriment of others. 194
Soon after adopted, then, the definition requirement became another technical
challenge inherit to forestry activities in the CDM. In 2006, FAO issued its Forest and
Climate Change Working Paper 4 specifically addressing the issue of choosing a forest
definition for the CDM, and presenting recommendations for a country to choose the best
parameters to the definition of forest, based on the criteria that would better serve the
interests of a non-Annex I Party when participating in the CDM. 195 Proper selection of
parameters, conceived by the Marrakesh Accords in defining forests, has a direct effect on
eligible areas for afforestation and reforestation projects, and reflects the evolution of the
topic, while adding another technical challenge upon participant Parties and developers.
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iii. Defining Baseline and Monitoring Methodologies
Complex enough by nature, baseline scenarios and monitoring methodologies 196 are
even more challenging in the ambit of afforestation and afforestation activities than they are
for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. 197 The credibility of the CERs from
afforestation and reforestation projects is constantly at stake due to anthropogenic and
naturally-occurring phenomena that can disturb the project. 198 As a result, up-to-date there
are just over 5 approved baseline and monitoring methodologies for afforestation and
reforestation projects, against more than 50 for energy efficiency and renewable energy
activities. 199 Thus, the regulatory development of standards for determining baselines and
monitoring methodologies is a remarkable evolution in the CDM forestry legal framework,
but also a major and necessary technical challenge.
iv. Non-Permanence / Reversibility & Leakage
Two additional technical challenges typical to forestry project activities are nonpermanence and leakage 200 . Based on the experience provided by the AIJ pilot phase, the
2000 IPCC special report on LULUCF identified the lack of proper addressability of nonpermanence and leakage by project developers.201 Almost five years latter, the forestry
legal framework adopted in Milan at COP-9 evolved by expressly incorporating “leakage”
as long as it can be measured (there must be an outside damage, and it must be quantified)
and attributable (causation) to the forestry project activity. 202 As to the reversibility issue,
the Parties adopted IPCC’s second recommendation by imposing a minimum crediting
period of 20 years with the possibility of being renewed twice, and a maximum of 30 years
without renewal. 203
c. Environmental Impacts
According to the 2000 IPCC special report on LULUCF, forestry projects in the
CDM “aiming to mitigate climate change may provide socioeconomic and environmental
benefits primarily within project boundaries, although they may also pose risks of negative
impacts”. 204 These impacts can be of environmental, socio-economic and cultural nature.
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i. Conversion of Forested Areas into Plantations, Grazing, and
Agricultural Land
The expansion of allowable forestry activities could encourage replacement of
mature old grown forests by fast growing tree plantations, and conversion into cropland and
grazing land with higher rates of carbon sequestration potentials. 205 While limited to
afforestation and reforestation projects, the risks are diminished based on the own
definitions of these activities provided by the climate change regime. 206 The rationale for
establishing a historical baseline is to avoid deforestation of mature forests for subsequent
re-growth for CDM carbon credit purposes. 207
On the other hand, if the CDM legal framework is properly used (and the practice is
already demonstrating positive actions) 208 it can provide the means to avoid harmful
conversions. One possibility for subsequent commitment periods would be the inclusion in
the CDM of accountability for the carbon net source of deforestation practices before any
replacement and/or conversion of forested land into fast-growing tree plantation, grazing
and cropland management. 209 Another would be allowing for forest preservation and
conservation projects under the CDM. 210 Mature forests do not have the same sequestration
potentials, but credits could be conferred upon carbon storage. 211 In this case, though, some
degree of flexibility in the “human-induced” criterion would have to be provided. 212
In any event, preserving the role of the CDM EB, and strengthening the CDM
forestry legal framework are necessary requirements to expanding the list of permissible
LULUCF activities in future commitment periods.
ii. Biodiversity
Considering the abovementioned threats of harmful conversions, the impacts on
biodiversity have the potential to be catastrophic. To the contrary, if actions are well
articulated taken into consideration existing ecosystems protective provisions, in addition
with forest conservation projects for future commitment periods, the impacts can be rather
positive ones. 213 Therefore, the climate change regime shall be seen as an important
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available tool by different stakeholders involved with biodiversity conservation, rather than
an obstacle that has to be overcome.
iii. Natural Ecosystems
Either positively or negatively, CDM forestry project activities also have the
potential to impact natural ecosystems. Among potential threats posed by forestry projects
to natural ecosystems are introduction of invasive alien species, 214 increases in erosion
processes, 215 and adverse impacts on water supplies. 216 The synthesis report on projects
undertaken in the pilot phase reflected positive impacts on natural ecosystems, such as
“improving water quality and reducing erosion of hydrological issues.” 217 In this sense,
worth noticing that the same provisions in the climate change regime designed to protect
biodiversity are extended to the protection of natural ecosystems. 218
iv. Leakage
Leakage, in addition to constituting a technical challenge for the trading scheme,
also has the potential to adversely impact the environment. Taking the hypothetical
example of a reforestation project in a degraded pasture land; if the replacement of the
pasture land into forested area leads to the practice of deforestation elsewhere for the
creation of new grazing land, the area deforested faces significant environmental
impacts. 219
d. Socio-Economic Impacts
An analysis of the socio-economic impacts is required whenever deemed relevant
by the host country or the project participants.220 For the purpose of this section, socioeconomic impacts of forestry projects are examined in light of capacity-building related to
employment opportunities and/or job losses, international trade, financial return to local
entities, and financial public and private forestry subsidies.
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i. Capacity-building & Transfer of Sound Technology
Due to the complexities of the CDM forestry mechanism, 221 and the consequent
demand for high qualified technical personnel, in addition to the implementation of new
technologies, forestry projects in developing country could lead to job losses, or open
employment opportunities mainly for developed countries personnel instead. 222 But one
important element to dissuade this premise is that for these types of project activities the
involvement of local communities is a quasi requirement for the achievement of the desired
positive effects. 223 Consequently, and based on previous experiences undertaken during the
pilot phase, the likely trend is that forestry project activities will significantly increase
capacity-building and employment opportunities in developing countries, as well as benefit
local communities with transfer of new and sound technologies. 224
ii. International Trade
Presumably, only “[p]rojects affecting the supply of timber products or consumption
of energy services, for example, can affect price signals for the rest of the market,
potentially counteracting a portion of the calculated benefits of the original project.” 225 This
means that the currently allowed afforestation and reforestation project activities have little
or no potential to affect international trade, because the timber products such projects are
generating did not exist in the first place, adding to the fact that they have to undergo
undisturbed 226 . Therefore, they could not possibly impact the existing timber market. 227
Nonetheless, during the discussions for upcoming commitment periods on to whether or not
to allow for other LULUCF activities, such as forest conservation and management,
harmonized policies and actions between the climate change regime and other international
forest forums are strongly recommended. 228
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iii. Local Participation & Financial Return to Local Stakeholders
Any potential interference with the needs of local stakeholders caused by a CDM
forestry activity has not only to be properly assessed, but generate enough income capable
of offsetting eventual losses. 229 Even before the tighter regulation on modalities and
procedures for forestry projects in the CDM adopted at COP.9, 2004, 230 the IPCC in its
2000 special report had identified that enabling local stakeholders to share the financial
benefits of CDM forestry activities was a necessary social condition. 231 A significant
regulatory step towards the implementation of a framework that could effectively embrace
profitability to local participation was the provision for small-scale afforestation and
reforestation projects, targeting low-income communities and individuals. 232
While the international legal work is already in place, added the factor that the
practice is still incipient 233 , the challenges for upcoming commitment periods are promising
and include: firstly, considerations over profitability sharing in forest management and
conservation projects, allowing also for local participation in the decision-making process
at all levels (from project conception to project implementation and management) 234 ; and
secondly, domestic policies and measures harmonized with the international legal
framework so as to allow local communities to benefit from forestry project activities. 235
iv. Domestic CDM Forestry Subsidies
A domestic CDM forestry subsidy scheme harmonized with the climate change
international legal framework is a powerful incentive tool for current afforestation and
reforestation projects, and also for other LULUCF activities eventually included in
upcoming commitment periods. This harmonization should start with the elimination of
conflicting domestic subsidies as directed by the Parties at COP/MOP-1; 236 for example,
like the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (‘CITIES’) or the
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domestic legislation penalizing forest conservation and promoting land clearance
(deforestation) for agricultural purposes and urban sprawl. 237
Worth noticing, that public subsidies are not limit to financial support. Rather they
may encompass a variety of different governmental encouragement actions such as direct
payment in cash, goods or services to forest landowners for promoting carbon
sequestration, purchase of land or land interests, implementation of general forest
management service programmes, among others. 238 Thus, national public subsidies to
LULUCF project activities shall be planned not only accordantly to the international legal
framework, but also to other domestic subsidies for forest management generally.
5. Overcoming Obstacles and Adverse Impacts of Forest and Forestry Project
Activities Under the CDM for Upcoming Commitment Periods
Overall, if well managed and implemented, project-based forest and forestry
activities in the CDM beyond just afforestation and reforestation practices can serve many
environmental, social and economic purposes and benefit small rural and poor communities
and individuals. The political, policies, legal and technical challenges and obstacles, and
risks of forest management and conservation projects to biodiversity, watersheds or to
promoting deforestation are overcome by the positives impacts. 239 This section, then, is
dedicated to examining trends and proposing actions for future commitment periods.
a. Potential Upcoming Trends to Overcoming Political, Policies and Legal
Obstacles
In overcoming the U.S. resistance to the Kyoto Protocol, two possibilities can play a
major role. First, the 2006 U.S. congressional election saw the Democratic Party take the
majority from the Republicans, which could indicate a Democratic victory in the 2008
presidential election. Based on the Democratic sensibility to climate change, and
considering that the Clinton administration signed the Kyoto Protocol but faced a
Republican Congress, one could expect that the U.S. is much more likely to ratify the
Protocol. 240
With respect to the EU, two factors indicate that it will not easily accept forestry
activities in the CDM in future commitment periods. The EU refusal to accept credits from
forestry project-activities in the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Directive is the first
clear indication. 241 But also, should the afforestation and reforestation limitation be
237
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maintained in the CDM in future commitment periods, the language used in the ETS
suggests that is not likely that the EU will accept the expansion of allowable activities. 242 In
the EU ETS Directive legislators used the term LULUCF instead of just afforestation and
reforestation, 243 what indicates that the EU, already anticipating future attempts to
broadening the scope of forestry projects in the CDM, opted to exclude them all in advance
from its ETS.
Finally, currently CDM forestry activities limitation to afforestation and
reforestation projects can legally be overcome for future commitment periods. Decision
11.CP.7 provides that the limitation is valid for the first commitment period only, and that
the Parties should decide upon new LULUCF activities for upcoming commitment
periods. 244
b. Stronger Link Between the Climate Change Legal Regime and Other
Major Multilateral Environmental Agreements

In the topic of CDM forestry activities, in light of environmental, social and
political implications arising internationally from the climate change debate, it is crucial
that the legal regime create links beyond the Liaison Group envisioned to coordinate
actions amongst the Rio Conventions (UNFCCC, CBD, and UNCCD). 245 Stronger
communications channels ought to be opened with the World Bank and International Labor
Organization (ILO) on the potential implications and benefits of project-based forestry
activities on employment conditions and opportunities, following the example set by the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 246 On the crosscutting issues of biodiversity and
CDM forestry projects, FAO has provided a paradigm to be followed in the socio-economic
area by developing a specific study on the interlinkages between biological diversity and
climate change. 247 Firmer institutional cooperation beyond interconnected environmental
areas would help to prevent poor social conditions such as the ones threatening the
credibility of CDM biofuels and biomass project activities. 248

Protocol and EU Emissions Trading Scheme, do not reward forestholders for reduced emissions from avoided
deforestation.”).
242
See Sagemuller, supra note 12, at 233 (noting that the EU decision not to recognize credits from LULUCF
activities is based on the premise that forestry credits are obtained relatively at low price reducing emissions
allowances prices and inhibiting domestic actions to curb greenhouse gases emissions).
243
EU Directive 2004/101 art. 1(2), supra note 122.
244
Decision 11/CP.7 annex to draft decision, supra note 45, at 61.
245
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Eighth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 13/CP.8, Cooperation
with other conventions, New Delhi, Oct. 23 - Nov. 1, 2002, 32 FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 (March 28, 2003)
[hereinafter Decision 13/CP.8].
246
FAO Climate Change and the Forest Sector, supra note 18, at 31 (considering employment and local
benefits in proposing guidelines to national legislations harmonized with the CDM forestry legal framework).
247
Id., at 4.
248
See Inter-American Development Bank official website,
http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/articledetail.cfm?artid=3779&language=En (last visited April 23, 2007)
[hereinafter IADB homepage] (announcing investments in ethanol and biofuels production while closely
examining questions regarding labor conditions).

38

c. Environmental and Socio-Economic Impact Analysis and Assessments
(EIA / SEIA)
The importance of an environmental impact assessment, and in the CDM forestry
context also a socio-economic impact assessment, is doubtless. Nonetheless, two major
factors appear to limit the power of climate change negotiators to go beyond merely
requiring preliminary analyses instead of an impact assessment before any risk can be
potentially foreseen. The first one is a legal limitation. Article 21 of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration clearly states that countries have the sovereign right to exploit their own natural
resources, pursuant to their own environmental policies. 249 In addition, Principle 17 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, while embracing EIA, establishes that
it shall be conducted when the proposed activity is likely to adversely impact the
environment. 250
The second factor limiting climate change negotiators to require an impact
assessment as a starting pre-condition to project validation seems to be of policy nature.
That is, the whole validation, verification and certification process for afforestation and
reforestation projects are already overburdensome, bureaucratic, and time consuming in
nature, and also present high procedural costs. Adding an environmental and socialeconomic impact assessment for those projects that, at first, do not present the risk for any
adverse impacts would make CDM forestry activities practically unfeasible in light of the
aforementioned legal, political, policies and technical obstacles already in place. 251
d. Good Governance: Education, Training, Public Awareness, Land
Tenure, Transparency, and Domestic Accountability.
Good governance in the CDM forestry can be achieved by supporting domestic
legislation to enhance the role of sinks in the climate change legal regime, 252 which
includes inter alia: developing instruments to combat corruption, regulating ownership and
management of public forested areas, and reconciling the interests of private owners (land
tenure), promoting education, training and public awareness, and ensuring transparency. 253
Those are key elements for the success of the CDM forestry scheme for the upcoming, and
most importantly, during the debates for subsequent commitment periods. 254 The positive
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interaction of the aforementioned socio-economic elements with the forestry practice is
crucial in overcoming the obstacles and challenges faced by the CDM forestry activities for
future commitment periods. 255
6. Conclusion
Forest and forestry projects in the CDM were extremely controversial during the
climate change negotiations, and the result was a legal limitation to only afforestation and
reforestation practices. The main concerns included the fact that forest and forestry
activities are difficult to monitor, provided cheap carbon credits inhibiting stronger
domestic mitigation action, and the fear that those projects could lead to deforestation.
However, the fact is that CDM forest and forestry projects can provide benefits that
overcome their downsides. Among the benefits, if flexibility on the human-induced
requirement is allowed for future commitment periods, forest conservation projects can
help fostering biodiversity, and sustainable forestry practices can provide positive revenue
alternatives for local communities.
In order for that to occur, current obstacles such as the U.S. resistance in ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol, the EU refusal in accepting CDM LULUCF credits, and the legal
limitation on the allowable practices need to be overcome. At the same time, technical
challenges, including additionality, defining baseline and monitoring methodologies,
choosing a domestic definition for forest, overseeing issues of non-permanence and
leakages, while extremely tight, are necessary instruments to assure the positive outcomes
of forestry projects capable of softening the resistance for upcoming commitment periods.
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